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at 618 (citing City of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US. 789, 
796-98 ( 1.984)). A statute should not be 
struck down for being overbroad, "un-
less there is a realistic danger that the 
statute itself will significantly compro-
mise recognized First Amendment pro-
tections of parties not before the Court." 
[d. at 465, 569 A2d at 618 (quoting 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 us. at 801). 
Section 121 contains applicable en-
forcement standards, and does not reach 
beyond conduct which can be regulated 
consistent with the first amendment. 
The court concluded, therefore, that 
Section 121 was not overbroad. [d. 
Judge Eldridge argued vehemently 
against state restrictions on the volume 
level of protected speech in his dissent. 
Judge Eldridge was of the opinion that 
Diehl stood for the proposition that the 
phrase "loud and unseemly" could only 
serve to limit speech which "presented 
a clear and present danger of violence, 
or [speech] not intended as communi-
cations but merely as a guise to disturb 
other persons." [d at 470, 569 A2d at 
620 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). He found 
Section 121 unconstitutional as applied 
because the limitations on speech made 
the delivery of speech a crime.[d at 473, 
569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge,]., dissent-
ing). Judge Eldridge went on to note 
that" [a )nnoyance at ideas can be cloaked 
in annoyance at sound" [d. at 475,569 
A.2d at 623 (quoting Saia v. New York, 
334 us. 558,562 (1948)) (Eldridge,]., 
dissenting). He then criticized the 
majority which found that "[s]ound is 
one of the most intrusive means of 
communication," and pointed out that 
"sound, in the form of the spoken word, 
is the most basic thing protected by the 
First Amendment." [d. at 476, 569 A.2d 
at 624 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). 
Judge Eldridge found the court's re-
quirement of prior warning an illusory, 
ineffective protection as any time 
government authorities desire to sup-
press first amendment activity, they 
could easily find complainants to give 
prior warnings. [d. at 490, 569 A2d at 
630 (Eldridge, ]., dissenting). He be-
lieved that Eanes' speech was within his 
constitutional guarantees and concluded 
his dissent expressing his fear for those 
persons who speak on controversial 
topics. [d. at 500, 569 A.2d at 635-36. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
"balanc[ed] one's right to express him-
self and other's right to be free from 
disruption." [d. at 467,569 A.2d at 619. 
The Court concluded that Section 121 is 
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial governmental inter-
est and leaves open ample alternative 
channels of communication. Eanes was 
given fair notice that the volume level of 
his speech would be subject to prosecu-
tion ifit was not lowered. Therefore, the 
statute did not violate Eanes' right to 
free speech. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Jones v. State: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IS VIOLATED 




In Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279,572 
A2d 169 (1990), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, held that a police stop of a 
bicyclist for investigatory purposes based 
on a hunch, without a reasonable articu-
lable suspicion justifying the stop, vio-
lated the fourth amendment. The court 
reasoned that a seizure occurred when 
the officer commanded the bicyclist to 
stop, thus affording fourth amendment 
protection. 
Carl Lee J ones was riding his bicycle 
at 3:20 a.m. carrying a grocery bag hang-
ing from the handlebars and, apparently, 
drycleaning bags across his shoulders 
and travelled from the general direction 
of a drycleaning store. The area where 
J ones was riding had been the scene of 
several recent burglaries. Officer Brown 
spotted Jones and in language to the 
effect of "hey, could you come here," 
commanded him to stop. Once stopped, 
the officer noticed a bulge in Jones' 
jacket pocket that appeared to be a 
handgun. A pat down search yielded a 
.25 caliber pistol. A subsequent search 
of the grocery bag yielded various quan-
tities of cocaine, marijuana, and other 
p_araphemalia Jones was arrested and 
charged with possession and intent to 
distribute cocaine, possession of mari-
juana, and unlawful wearing and trans-
porting of a handgun. 
Prior to trial, Jones made a motion to 
suppress the evidence on the ground 
that the search and seizure was illegal 
because of the illegal stop. Jones, 319 
Md. at 280, 572 A.2d at 170. The trial 
court denied his motion based on its 
finding that the initial encounter was 
not a seizure. Jones was convicted. [d 
The court of special appeals affirmed 
the conviction, finding the initial en-
counter was a "mere accosting", and not 
a seizure under the fourth amendment. 
[d. at 282, 572 A.2d at 171. The court 
determined that the stop was a "mere 
accosting" because there was no show 
of force or weapons used to effectuate 
the stop; and, therefore, the trial court 
properly denied the motion to suppress. 
[d. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari. 
The issue on appeal was whether the 
stop was a legal seizure under the fourth 
amendment. Jones argued that an illegal 
stop and seizure occurred when the 
police ordered the stop of his bicycle 
without reasonable articulable suspicion. 
[d. The state posited two competing 
arguments. Either there was no error 
by the trial judge and therefore, the stop 
was consensual rather than custodial in 
nature and was not a seizure. Alterna-
tively, if the stop was a seizure, there was 
sufficient articulable suspicion to justify 
the stop. [d. 
The court began its analysis by stating 
the general rule that a police stop is a 
seizure when a reasonable person would 
feel that his freedom to walk away was 
restrained. [d. at 282, (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968)). Additionally, 
the court, in distinguishing a seizure 
from a "mere accosting" held that a 
seizure occurs when an individual to 
whom questions are posed does not feel 
free to disregard the questions and walk 
away. [d. at 283, 572 A.2d 171 (citing 
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 us. 544 
( 1980)). Adopting a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach to determine what 
constitutes a seizure, the court stated 
that one or all of the following factors 
may persuade a trial court that a seizure 
occurred: (1) threatening presence of 
several officers; (2) show or use of a 
weapon; (3) physical contact by the 
officer; or ( 4) authoritative tone or lan-
guage by the officer indicating an order 
rather than a request. [d. 
Applying the Mendenhall factors, the 
court noted in Florida v. Royer, 460 u.s. 
491 (1983), that merely approaching an 
individual and asking questions consti-
tuted a voluntary stop and was not a 
seizure unless the person approached 
was detained. Rejecting the use of a 
bright line test, the court instead posited 
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additional factors to consider when deter-
mining whether a seizure occurred: 
( 1) police use of sirens or flashers; 
(2) use of a command to stop or halt, or 
show or use of a weapon; or (3) operat-
ing a road block or otherwise control-
ling the flow of traffic.]ones, 319 Md at 
285, 572A.2dat 172 (citingMichiganv. 
Chesternut, 486 u.s. 567 ( 1988) ). 
In applying both the Mendenhall and 
Chesternut factors, the court of appeals 
found that the officer seized Jones when 
he commanded him to stop because the 
situation was such that a reasonable per-
son would not feel free to walk away. 
jones, 319 Md. at 285, 572 A.2d at 172. 
First, the officer was uniformed and driv-
ing a marked police car, and the hail trans-
lated into a command to compel Jones 
to stop. Further, the court stated, that it 
was reasonable for the defendant to feel 
constrained to stop, since to disobey or 
ignore an officer would be an offense. [d. 
(citing Md. Transp. Code Ann. section 
21-103(a)( 1987)). Thus, the court con-
duded that" given these circumstances, 
the average citizen, not being able to 
distinguish a mere accosting from a 
seizure, would have viewed the actions 
of the police officer's intimidating 
enough to have complied." jones, 319 
Md. at 286,572 A.2d at 172-73. 
The court analogized the level of 
physical control over Jones by the police 
with the level of control it held suffi-
cient to constitute a seizure in State v. 
Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 568 A.2d 48 
( 1990). In Lemmon, an officer identi-
fied himself to a suspect and stated 
"come here" as a command to the sus-
pect to stop. When the suspect ran, the 
police chased him on foot and also tried 
to block his escape with a police car. 
The court held that the suspect was 
seized by the police at the initial en-
counter when they commanded him to 
stop. The jones court conduded that 
Jones, like the suspect in Lemmon, was 
seized when the police commanded 
him to stop, because at that point, he did 
not feel free to walk away. jones, 319 
Md. at 287, 572 A.2d at 173. 
Finding the initial encounter a seiz-
ure, the Court considered the state's 
alternative argument regarding the rea-
sonableness of the stop. [d. The court 
noted that the officer admitted having 
no knowledge of any crime committed 
either at that approximate time or in 
that approximate location. [d. The court 
further noted that Jones was riding a 
bicyde in an area where recent burglar-
ies occurred, carring what appeared to 
be drydeaning bags across his shoulders, 
and travelling from the general direc-
tion of a drydeaning store, and that 
these facts alone were not sufficient for 
the officer to have formed a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion to justify the 
stop. [d. The court conduded that the 
officer acted on a hunch that Jones was 
involved in or fleeing from a crime when 
he commanded him to stop; and, there-
fore, the stop was illegal. [d. at 288, 572 
A.2d at 174. 
The court of appeals has expanded 
the holding in Lemmon to the factually 
different case of a bicyclist, by finding 
that Jones was seized at the point when 
the officer commanded him to stop. 
Thus, a police officer must have a reaso-
nable articulable suspicion to stop a 
bicyclist, like a motorist or pedestrian, 
or the stop will violate the fourth 
amendment. 
- Laura Campbell 
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A defense against cancer 
can be cooked up in your kitchen. 
There is evidence that diet 
and cancer are related. Some 
foods may promote cancer, while 
others may protect you from it. 
Foods related to lower-
ing the risk of cancer of the 
larynx and esophagus all have 
high amounts of carotene, 
a form of Vitamin A which 
is in cantaloupes, peaches, 
broccoli, spinach, all dark 
green leafy vegetables, sweet 
potatoes, carrots, pumpkin, 
winter squash and tomatoes, 
citrus fruits and brussels 
sprouts. 
Foods that may 
help reduce the risk 
of gastrointestinal 
and respiratory 




Fruits, vegetables, and whole-
grain cereals such as oatmeal, bran 
and wheat may help lower the risk 
of colorectal cancer. 
Foods high in fats, salt- or 
nitrite-cured foods like ham, and 
fish and 
types of sausages smoked by tradi-
tional methods should be 
eaten in moderation. 
Be moderate in 
consumption of alco-
hol also. 
A good rule of 
thumb is cut down on 
fat and don't be fat. 
Weight reduction may 
lower cancer risk. Our 
12- year study of nearly a 
million Americans uncovered 
high cancer risks particularly 
among people 40% or more 
overweight. 
Now, more than ever, we 
know you can cook up your own 
defense against cancer. So eat 
healthy and be healthy. 
cancer alone. AMERICAN 
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